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What if all we can see are the parts, and there is not a whole: 
elements and manifestations of the making of law of 
'climate justice' 
Abstract 
This essay discusses the meaning of 'climate justice' and the ways in which it is or is not materialised 
currently in climate change litigation. First I present the immateriality of the abstract concepts that make 
up this composite term: 'climate' and 'justice'. Yet the placing the words adjacent to one another seems to 
mobilise them into a novel composite vehicle of legal action. I trace how the idea of 'climate justice' 
hovers as an elusive idea around the concrete particularities of what can be known about 'climate' 
specifically in relation to 'justice'. These questions are probed in the setting and context of the Philippine 
Human Rights Commission's 2018 Inquiry into the Carbon Majors' (Chevron, Exxon, Shell, BP etc.) 
violation of human rights. 
The aim here is mainly diagnostic: rather than taking legal doctrines of environmental or international 
human rights law as analytical materials, I use a legal materialist approach in order to try to make sense of 
what is concretely happening when an issue of a planetary scale of complexity is addressed and 
represented in a medium-sized moot court room. It helps to bring into vision the specific modes by which 
formats, places and media are enlisted as constitutive elements in the becoming and stabilisation of the 
emerging legal matter of climate justice. My analysis depicts law acting as the medium for upscaling (an 
idea of human justice) and downscaling (of climate science) different knowledges into other frameworks 
of reality than their original ones: to that of the human narrative scale.  
  
2 
What if all we can see are the parts, and there is 
not a whole: elements and manifestations of the 
making of law of 'climate justice' 
 
Hyo Yoon Kang 
 
 
That justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and 
should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles... Left to itself, the incalculable 
and giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always 
be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation... And so incalculable justice requires us to calculate.  
 
Derrida (1990: 971) 
 
My matter of concern is 'climate justice'.  
On 6 and 7 November 2018 I attended the London segment of a series of landmark 
'climate justice' hearings that took place in the Moot Court Room of the London School 
of Economics (LSE). It was part of the Philippine Human Rights Commission's Inquiry 
("Carbon Major Inquiry") into claims of human rights violations attributed to - or caused 
by - so-called Carbon Major companies (Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, Shell and others). 
The Inquiry was initiated in 2015 by individual Philippine citizens and civil rights 
organisations with the help of Greenpeace. The hearings took place in Manila, at the 
Columbia University in New York and at the LSE between March and December 2018. 
They were livestreamed, video-recorded and transcribed. These media are freely available 
on the Human Rights Commission's website (https://essc.org.ph/content/nicc/).  
The Inquiry resembled a tribunal in its format than an adjudication or litigation. 
Legally speaking, there was no dispute between parties, but a petition was taken up. The 
Inquiry was also unusual in the sense that the Commission has no jurisdiction in the 
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countries where the Carbon Majors are incorporated, and this might have been reflected 
in the particular way it was conducted. The findings of the Inquiry are not legally binding, 
but the Commission hopes that they will contribute to the building of an emerging 
domestic and international jurisprudence of 'climate justice'.  
This essay is an attempt to understand how a complex matter of a planetary scale 
would be materialised into a 'legal' matter in a hearing in a moot court room (is it 'moot'? 
is it 'law'?) in central London: how do you put and relate a planet, wind and precipitation 
of "super-typhoons" in the Philippines, rain-drenched shivering children, floating corpses, 
mud, hunger, thirst, lack of sanitation, computer datasets, digital algorithms, scientists, 
ethicists, pension actuaries, lawyers, youtube livestream, court file numbers, in a medium-
sized room over a period of two days? Initial conjectures to this question might be: 
'language' or 'discourse' employed in 'legal fiction', or ways of representing the 'world' 
within the legal language and performance of human rights. In Latourian terms, we could 
say that these disparate elements were associated into a chain of reference so to relate to 
one another (Latour 1984). Yet, at the moment, there seems to be more unstable relations 
and materials at play than a human-linguistic, metaphorical or actor-network post-facto 
analysis could intimate. This is because justice and climate are both abstract concepts. 
The meaning of their composite, 'climate justice', is not clear. If the 'parts' (justice, 
climate) are moving and unstable concepts, how does law figure them 'whole' (climate 
justice)? Identifying the constitutive elements of an emerging legal matter is one issue, 
but the more difficult task is to diagnose the nature or dynamics of relations between the 
elements themselves. This entails delineating relations between three issues, which 
involve questions of scale, perspective and knowledge:  
First, if the court room and us are part of the planet, how exactly does the legal 
performance bring the 'whole' of which we are also part into our partial reality?1 This is 
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a question about my point of observation amidst different scales and about the ways in 
which I collate and assemble different parts despite a missing overall whole picture. The 
same question also applies to the Philippine Human Rights Commission: is it aware of its 
relative position within the planetary scale, both physically and in terms of its legal 
power? I show that the Commission sought to reflect as messily as possible the multiple 
and fractured realities and its own relations and situatedness within the legal and planetary 
spaces by carefully choosing certain places, media and format for the hearings. It did not 
posit an overarching perspective (for example, a trans-generational or trans-species 
justice or ideas of responsibility (Shue 2018)) or causal equivalence between different 
kinds of worlds: human experiential, legal and scientific. 
Second, 'climate justice' is an emerging legal principle and concern, which is 
increasingly associated with a human rights-focused litigation strategy. It does not yet 
have a stable legal reality, but the idea is invoked and enacted with a view from what it 
ought to 'be' and from decidedly human perspective and scale. In light of the matter of 
'climate justice' not being fully formed, I approach the Carbon Majors Inquiry from a 
legal materialist angle. This is helpful for putting together a detailed picture of how an 
abstract, vast, planetary matter of concern may become materialised as a legal matter of 
concern. It shows how legal materials, such as trial locations, settings, order of witness 
testimonies, mobilise in a miniature-scale something so big in scale that would normally 
be numbing and immobilising. I hope to bring into vision a more granular understanding 
of how law is made, particularly at times when its matters and materials are novel or in a 
flux. 
Third, legal determination of climate justice depends on establishing causality 
between the quantitative models of greenhouse gas emissions and the qualitative 
determination of legality: how exactly are the calculated attributions of historical 
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greenhouse emissions related to a legal attribution of human rights violation? How does 
law 'calculate' them in order to achieve 'climate justice', although justice is incalculable 
as Derrida had pointed out (opening quote)? These questions concern shifts between 
multiple scales and viewpoints in legal modes of knowing. I examine what counts as 
legally material knowledge in the unusual framework of the Carbon Majors Inquiry and 
consider whether the international human rights law framework is suited to grasp and 
adequately represent the different concerns that converge in and simultaneously exceed 
human language and cognition.  
The aim of this essay is diagnostic. It observes and describes the three above 
sketched issues within a specific setting in which 'climate justice' has been invoked. The 
genre is an essay; it tries to make sense of what is happening in the current torrent of 
events by taking a step back from the growing association of the meaning of 'climate 
justice' with international human rights and development. In the first two sections, I 
discuss the elusive value of 'justice' and then the abstract scientific concept of 'climate'. 
Yet the placing these two abstract ideas adjacent to one another, a literal spatial and 
temporal juxtaposition, seems to mobilise them into a novel composite vehicle of legal 
action. In the third section, I describe the emergent materialisation of 'climate justice' in 
the Philippine Carbon Major Inquiry's London hearings. Less focused on the Inquiry's 
findings, I am more interested in the material techniques and formats by which a legal 
matter of 'climate justice' becomes established: the unusual set-up of the mediatised 
hearings and the juxtaposition of numerical and visual representations of climate with 
personal narratives of climate change by victims of super-typhoons.  
This essay eschews a doctrinal analysis of environmental or international human 
rights law, or of multi-level jurisdictional issues. This is because I can neither identify a 
sufficiently delineated object of inquiry ('climate justice' - although it is very much 
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desired and its lack is felt) nor an existing method (legal doctrines were emerging rather 
than already there). Instead of assuming 'climate justice' as a premise or as an activist 
strategy, I hope to get a better sense of its present reality at the end of the analysis. I trace 
its current form and substance by attending to the specific modes by which words, 
utterances and objects act as constitutive materials for this emerging legal matter (see 
introduction to this issue; Kang 2018; Kang & Kendall 2019). A legal materialist focus 
might better bring into vision the complex and contrary particularities of our present 
moment than a doctrinal top-down analysis or a policy-driven bottom-up 'recipe'.  
 
1 Looking for justice 
Derrida wrote that justice is unrepresentable, incalculable, excessive, donatrice, a gift 
(1990). Perhaps it was precisely the absence of justice related to matters of climate that 
mobilised 'climate justice' as a composite claim. I understand the claim's strategic utility 
to consist in being able to hold at least someone or something (a legally incorporated 
persona, such as a corporation or government) legally attributable now for the climate 
crisis, which has however had and will continue to have a longue durée of past, present 
and future.  
In a moral, philosophical sense, climate justice does not have a stable meaning. 
Although justice is what most people will seek and equate with the legal system, when 
they bring a claim, and identify it as the purpose of law, it is elusive even in what seems 
most satisfying adjudicatory outcomes, which deliver some kind of recognition of pain, 
guilt, punishment, perhaps even restoration and remedy. But more often than not, law 
fails expectations of righteousness and moral certainty in adjudication; what seems 
justified for one party will not be so for the other. Otherwise they would not be in dispute. 
Most legal scholars and lawyers do not assume an overlap between law and moral justice, 
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nor do they expect law to equate to or deliver 'justice'. This is often perceived as a gap 
between what is desired and what is achieved, and that is what makes law so disappointing 
and infuriating. I have yet to come across a law school module entitled 'Justice'; in 
political theory and ethics, there are many. In law, both in word and practice, justice is 
often framed as a question of fairness of procedure, reconstruction of events, evidentiary 
status, admissibility and judicial interpretation in inquisitorial civil law settings or 
weighing of arguments presented by the parties in light of statute and precedents in more 
adversarial common law traditions. A legal decision comes about as a result of the more 
convincing legal interpretation formed into a better argument. The scale of justice does 
not weigh the just against the unjust, but on the one side, there is the weight of arguments 
and, on the other, the counter-arguments.2 Whatever remains of justice is procedurally 
performed and bound in which the 'whole' picture is elusive.  
Justice is not a legal doctrine or principle. It is - to use Latour's terminology - not a 
legal matter of concern. This sounds harsh, but this is not to say that it does not exist in 
different forms or manifestations of legal matters. It hovers as a real spectre around 'law', 
but is not part or inside of it. As Derrida wrote, "one cannot speak directly about justice, 
thematize or objectivize justice, say "this is just" and even less "I am just," without 
immediately betraying justice, if not law (droit)." (1990: 935) What most legal theorists 
and scholars would agree on is that law has a specific 'internal' language and rules of the 
game which need to be mastered to understand it (Hart's internal point of view or 
Wittgenstein's language game) and that it relies on specific institutionalised media and a 
tradition of material techniques to perform its legality. Yet law's origins and practical 
effects are 'external' because they depend on a group's agreement about a legitimate 
recourse to sanction. Such an understanding of law as an effect or force can be found in 
Benjamin's understanding of Gewalt, which denotes latent power or 'force'. Gewalt was 
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translated and connoted misleadingly as violence into French and English (Derrida 1990: 
927).3  
Differently for Derrida, legal force is not a sovereign-juridical violence, but a 
différance of force, as he emphasised "also and especially of all the paradoxical situations 
in which the greatest force and the greatest weakness strangely enough exchange places. 
And that is the whole history." (1990: 929) Legal force is not always physical enforcement 
and violence. Conversely, violence could also be understood as the effect of the non-event 
of expected legal 'force': increased pressure to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
and out-of-court settlements, lack of enforcement of alimony payments, defendants with 
no legal representation because of lack of legal aid, etc. Moyn has criticised the hope 
placed in (human rights) law and pointed to their adverse effects (2018) that are akin to a 
joke of "cruel optimism", to paraphrase Lauren Berlant's term. I would argue that it is 
equally possible to understand law or 'legal force' as a cruel pessimism, in which the 
default is an expected absence of any legal force, not to mention its elusive Other, justice.4 
Such cruel pessimism is abound in domestic jurisdictions, but is particularly acute in 
international legal fields whose teeth depend on the interstice of the politically possible.  
Justice is what law cannot know and yet seeks as its unrepresentable essence. This 
raises the question why justice is still expected to be achieved through legal means and 
whether human justice could ever, even remotely, claim 'climate' justice, particularly 
when the meaning of 'climate' itself is abstract. Matters - issues - don't speak by 
themselves without rhetorical, spatial and temporal frameworks. This is why the set of 
techniques and mediations through which they become material need to be examined. 
Thinking about what is 'legal' about legal materiality, I argued against a simplistic 
understanding of materiality as physicality (2018): certain materials (physical objects, 
images, practices, techniques) become enlisted by legal reasoning and give body to legal 
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matters (matters of concern) in law, but the processes by which they become meaningful 
to law is not self-evident and needs to be explained. This implies that the idea of 'climate 
justice' may be located in the gap between legal matters (in this context, international 
human right principles) and the reality of its enactment through specific materials and 
their effects (the constitutive elements of the legal Inquiry and their lack of enforcement 
power).  
 
2 Looking for climate 
The other element in the composite of 'climate justice' is 'climate'. The concept of 'climate' 
is an unruly composition, which is often only manifested and becomes visible as a 
consequence of anomalies, for example, the effects of changing climate on biopolitics of 
population health and migration, geopolitical calculations on water, securement of food 
supplies. Climate is not a representation of a singular process. It is also not a linguistic 
representation of a weather event, measured by temperature or precipitation. Its material 
reality rather consists of a composition of historical extrapolations, measurements, past 
and projected data, mathematical calculations of averages and means, and computer 
algorithms. It is a deeply temporal, yet also abstract composite concept.  
In the scientific sense of the term, climate is an artefact of measurement and 
calculation of means. The World Meteorology Organisation defines climate as "the 
measurement of the mean and variability of relevant quantities of certain variables (such 
as temperature, precipitation or wind) over a period of time, ranging from months to 
thousands or millions of years." The average period to determine what is 'normal' and 
'abnormal' climate is 30 years. Climate in a wider sense is also "the state, including a 
statistical description, of the climate system" which consists of five components: the 
atmosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere, land surface and the biosphere also known as the 
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ecosphere or the environment. Gabriele Gramelsberger, a philosopher of science, points 
out that the notion of climate involves both a scaling-up of historical, local and singular 
data that are taken as proxies and extrapolated into uniform data and datasets (2017). 
These, in turn, are modelled with algorithms to make an assumption of a 'climate balance' 
as the zero-line 'normal' base case from an average of the past ten thousand years. The 
deviations from such a statistical mean value is then interpreted as climate change. Such 
a scientific concept of 'climate' is then a mediated and performative category that has 
undergone multiple layers of transpositions. It incorporates historical information, data, 
formats multiple singular data into uniformity, and renders them suitable for predictive 
modelling and simulations.  
Change of climate refers to a statistically significant variation in either the mean 
state of the climate or in its variability, persisting for an extended period (typically 
decades or longer). 'Climate change', in this sense, depends on a statistical calculation of 
norm and deviation; in other words, it is an anomaly based on a broader temporal 
statistical framework of 'climate' that mixes factual and extrapolated data (Edwards, 
2010). From the 1970s onwards, the noun 'climate change' however "became 'an issue' 
rather than the technical description of changing weather as it had been for the World 
Metereological Organisation in 1966." (Hulme 2014: 1).  
The qualification of what constitutes 'normal' degree of harmful weather - abnormal 
harm - as opposed to climate change-induced anomalous degree of harm is often 
ascertained by recourse to scientific papers and quantitative calculations of past 
observable data. At the Carbon Majors hearings in London in November 2018, Myles 
Allen, one of the co-authors of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)'s 
special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, 
referred to a scientific paper by Takayabu and others (2015) that argued that the 
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unprecedented intensity of storms can be traced back to human influences that led to an 
average of higher probability of increased wind level. Typhoon Haiyan that devastated 
the Philippines in 2013 was the strongest tropical cyclones ever recorded surpassing 
existing typhoon classification. The highest level until Haiyan was category 3. A new 
category of level 5 "super typhoon" had to be invented after Haiyan. It caused 
approximately 6201 deaths, more than 27000 injuries and the displacement of nearly four 
million people. But it is not only the singular catastrophic typhoon that is beyond the 
abnormal level of harm. The frequency of harmful weather also results in an accumulated 
effect of anomalous level of harm. Philippines suffers from more than twenty storms a 
year on average. 
Philippine is one of the countries assessed as being one of the most vulnerable to 
the effects of climate change to which it hardly contributed (Pretis 2018). Most countries 
who already do or will suffer from climate change are the ones which did not contribute 
to the accumulated and now exponential effects of human-caused climate change. Yet the 
actors and factors that caused those highly localised sufferings are not here or there in the 
sense of law. They no longer exist or are already dead: historical emitters, such as British 
coal-fuelled factories, or companies that have changed their corporate identities in their 
imperial histories, such as Burmah Oil that became Anglo-Persian Oil Company and later, 
BP (Mitchell 2011: 43-65). Or they are not 'legal persons' in the jurisdictions in which 
they can be addressed and held accountable for the consequences of their action (for 
example, global shipping systems, elements of which operate under multiple 
jurisdictions). Historically most of the emission of greenhouse gases stems from the US 
(Malm 2016). Global level of CO2 emission at 2018 was at a record. 
The materiality of 'climate' in the narrow meaning of the term is an organic and 
inorganic composite of organisms, tangible and intangible knowledge systems and 
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histories, which comprise a vast number of disparate elements that constitute the concept 
of 'climate',: gases, earth, plants, living organisms human and non-human, numbers, 
words, rock samples, photographs, computer algorithms for calculating means, 
simulations based on algorithmic models of future trends based on past data, scientists, 
international institutions, such as International Energy Agency, IPCC, parties of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, non-governmental organisations, working 
groups, emails, letters, meetings, protesters, networks on social media, plaintiffs, lawyers, 
judges, school pupils walking out, and so on. It is difficult to think of anything which 
would not qualify as being part of 'climate'.  
The concept of climate links particular and sensed experiences that cannot be 
ordinarily related to one another into an overarching explanatory framework and relations 
of causality and probability. At the same time, by creating an aggregated scientific 
representation and modelling of particular and fractured realities of historical and local 
observations, climate sciences eclipse the specific, concrete, particulars into an abstract 
scientific model and re-imagines them as future fractured realities through localised 
predictions of climate change impact. Science thus turns invisible the particular 
manifestations and experiences, but makes visible the overall explanatory framework. 
Our knowledge of climate and climate change “is a knowledge that can only be created 
via a techno-scientific apparatus so extensive that it is now an entire planetary 
infrastructure” (Wark 2015: 180). The scientific mode of knowledge shifts, reverses and 
invents different perspectives of our ability to 'see' and make sense of climate. Although 
such a scaling-up of vision entails all the problems associated with abstraction and its 
violence (Weizmann and Sheikh 2015), it also mobilises novel associations, such as the 
emerging legal practice of 'climate justice'.  
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3 Materialising the matter of climate justice: juxtaposing rather 
than translating  
The law of 'climate justice' is in the early stages of its formation (Jafry 2018; Klinsky and 
Brankovic 2018; Robinson 2018), although there is no shortage of academic work written 
on the ethics and political theory of climate change, referred to broadly as 'climate justice' 
(Shue 2018; Gardiner 2011; Vanderheiden 2008). Different legal subfields can be 
mobilised to articulate what is just or unjust in light of the effects of climate change: tort, 
environmental, international, property, intellectual property, medical, company laws (see 
Setzer & Vanhala for an overview of litigation relating to climate change, 2019); but 
increasingly the term 'climate justice' has become closely associated with an invocation 
of international law of human rights together the aim of 'development' (UN Special 
Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights 2019). It embodies the premises that 
justice is a human matter and that human suffering ought to be remedied in order to benefit 
politically underrepresented people.  
Despite, or precisely because of, its avowed link to the legalistic and universalistic 
vision of human rights, climate justice may perhaps never stabilise into a coherent and 
overarching set of legal matters, that is to say, doctrines or principles, paradoxically 
because of its planetary scale of the problem, which needs to be scaled down to a much 
smaller scale of cause and effect relations that is recognisable to legal modes of reasoning. 
So far legal claims for climate justice have been marked by a remarkable fragmentation 
of non-binding, binding and yet not enforceable, domestic and international legal 
obligations, agreements and laws.5 Yet in order for the scholar to observe how climate 
justice is increasingly figured as a legal matter, examining its materiality can help to break 
the complex matter down to its appearances, partial manifestations, experiences and 
materials: the text of the petition by the room of a 'climate justice' landmark hearing, the 
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testimonies and expressions of panelists, witnesses, audiences, powerpoint slides and the 
position and movement of the video camera. It is in this sense that a draft text for the Paris 
Agreement can be the battle site against manifestations of injustice propelled by climate 
change, which the South African negotiator, Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko, had described as 
a "recipe for apartheid" (Malm 2015). The constitutive materials and media in the making 
of law shape the composition of a legal matter. They enable the idea of 'climate justice' 
to attain legal reality.  
It is taken for granted but really rather odd, that legal internal processes and formats 
remain relatively constant in institutions and across various jurisdictions, despite the 
plethora and scales of different issues brought to adjudication, inquiry or legislative 
deliberation. The phenomena that are associated with climate change are unprecedented, 
but these events are brought to the courts or tribunals that might employ the same legal 
formats of giving evidence or resort to the same doctrines, rules and processes that might 
be used in the context of, for example, property disputes about trees causing subsidence 
and harming the value of your neighbour's property. This was the case in Lliuya v RWE 
(2015, currently ongoing in Oberlandesgericht Hamm, Germany, concerning Lliuya's 
claim for damages from the German utility company, RWE, for its proportional 
contribution to global warming that is claimed to have caused the melting of glacier 
damaging his property in Peru).6  
This is particularly strange considering that all of the manifestations of climate 
change operate on different scales of knowledge and perspectival origins: weather is a 
singular temporal and spatial observation, it is perceived and felt by humans, whereas 
climate is a mathematical notion in reference to a broader temporal and spatial 
framework. Climate denotes an absolute mean value, that is, a mathematical calculation 
that cannot be experienced. For example, in relation to the Watt-Cloutier petition seeking 
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relief from violations resulting from global warming caused by acts and emissions of the 
United States and submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the 
Commission declared the petition inadmissible since "the information provided does not 
enable us to determine whether the alleged facts would tend to characterise a violation of 
rights protected by the American Declaration".7 In other words, the Commission declared 
that human observations of changing weather and its effects, i.e. the "alleged facts", could 
neither be linked to the legal conception of human rights nor to the science of climate 
change. The elements of a narrative were there, but they could not be linked into one 
another to form a more stable whole. They were not meaningful as legal materials. The 
questions at stake are which kind of experience are seen and can be made more legally 
material and how these different knowledges and claims can be juxtaposed so to give 
substance to a legal matter of concern. How did the Philippine Human Rights 
Commission approach the legal matter of climate justice and attempt to give legal shape 
to a plethora of phenomena that were both experienced and numerically calculated? 
Commissioner Roberto Eugenio Cadiz, the presiding chair of the Commission, 
describes climate justice as an emerging idealistic and creative strategy of human rights 
law rather than reflecting an existing legal reality:  
The challenge to national human rights institutions is to test 
boundaries and create new paths, to be bold and creative 
instead of timid and docile, to be more idealistic and less 
pragmatic, to promote soft laws into becoming hard laws, 
to be able to see beyond legal technicalities and establish 
guiding principles that can later become binding treaties - 
in sum, to set the bar of human rights to a higher standard. 
(https://essc.org.ph/content/nicc/).  
A number of such creative litigation related to climate justice is ongoing in multiple 
jurisdictions at the time of writing.8 In London, Commissioner Cadiz straddled a fine 
balance between performing a recognisable legality, on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, stabilising a novel legal matter of concern by multiple associations: from historical 
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greenhouse gas emissions to climate change, and from the unprecedented intensity of past 
typhoons in the Philippines to human rights violations. The Inquiry explored the nature 
of these connections and their limits.  
The spatial-temporal process of this Inquiry was unusual by being multi-sited and 
virtual. Commissioner Cadiz emphasised at the start of the London hearings that the aim 
of the Inquiry was to initiate a global dialogue around climate change. The hearings were 
held in three cities: Manila, the seat of the Commission and its place of jurisdiction, as 
well as the global centres of New York and London where it had no jurisdiction. The 
hearings were accessible to members of the public and the press. They were also 
livestreamed. A professional camera man recorded the hearings, whilst simultaneously 
keeping an eye on the livestream youtube page. The decision to have multiple sites for 
the hearing was peculiar, but apt: none of the major carbon producing companies are 
headquartered in the Philippines or are Philippine legal entities, they were mainly 
American or European ones. Dr Joana Setzer of the Grantham Institute for Climate 
Change at the LSE explained to me that "Commissioner Cadiz wanted this to be a global 
issue. He wanted to initiate a global dialogue rather than an adversarial confrontation." 
The petitioners' website also states that" the process would be a dialogue and not an 
investigation to determine guilt or innocence." (ESSC, National Inquiry on Climate 
Change). Non-governmental organisations, such as Greenpeace, the Sabin Center for 
Climate Change at Columbia University and the Grantham Institute assisted the 
Commission in the set-up of the hearings.  
Cornelia Vismann had insightfully analysed differences between hearings, trials and 
television tribunals (2003). I wondered what would she have thought of this special multi-
location, multi-media, globally networked legal event. In the London hearings, the hard-
working camera man consulted with Dr Setzer at the beginning of the first day; moved 
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back and forth between the camera which was placed next to the desk for the invited 
testimonies and the computer at the back of the room that was connected to the 
powerpoint screen; established the skype connection and checked for volume. From the 
outset, the hearing was to be livestreamed, recorded and uploaded to the www. It is in this 
sense that the hearings instantaneously formed a digital 'archive' with the ability to be 
immediately retrieved and circulated. The video recordings and their online presence 
were perhaps even more significant than the physical locations. The digital availability 
and circulation of the recording amplifies and accelerates the hearing's status as an 
emergent (legal) matter considerably than the mere act of recording and inscribing a legal 
hearing in cellulose or silico. These digital mediations did not only reflect the global issue 
of climate justice that exceeded a single physical location, but it also strangely fit the 
plasticity and abstractness of both concepts of climate and justice. The online presence of 
the hearings gave shape to the composite term 'climate justice'. 
[insert 'Kang picture' here] 
Whereas the international mobilisation of NGOs, witnesses and experts reflected 
the multi-spatial nature of climate justice as an issue, the digital presence and multi-site 
format were certainly also creative solutions to the discrepancy between the occasion's 
momentous legal creative significance to build a necessarily international jurisprudence 
of 'climate justice' and the Commission's inability to enforce or award damages, because 
the formal format was that of an inquiry rather than one of litigation or adjudication. 
Although Dr Setzer introduced the Inquiry by embedding its importance in temporal 
terms as having an "impact on the past, present and the future", some carbon major 
companies had disputed the Commission's jurisdiction on the ground of the principle of 
territoriality. None of the carbon major corporations whose responsibilities were 
investigated were present at the hearings. The ethicist, Henry Shue, who testified via 
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skype from Oxford, observed: "I think it is disrespectful not to respond. It does not take 
the Commission seriously and that is insulting to the Commission." (my transcript) At the 
beginning of the first day of the hearings, Commissioner Cadiz recognised the legal norm 
of territorial jurisdiction and stated: "We respect the principle of territorial jurisdiction". 
Yet the legal status of the Inquiry remained a fluid one; at one point, Commissioner Cadiz 
corrected himself when he said "in this court" to "in this room".  
The London hearings took place in the medium-sized moot court room of the LSE 
Law Department. The room had been rearranged from its normal circular setting into a 
frontal one resembling a court. The Commissioners were seated slightly higher in a row 
facing the audience. The clerks sat to their right. Legal officials entered the room from a 
different door than the audience. The lawyers of the petitioners sat at a desk separated 
from the row of audience members. The witnesses and expert were summoned to a desk 
that was positioned between the audience and the Commission. It resembled the layout 
of a court room. Yet there were bits that gave inklings of this extraordinary yet somehow 
also strangely familiar mis-en-scène that distinguished it from a court of law. The overall 
atmosphere was one of a large gathering of people that already seemed to know each other 
from previous encounters. During breaks people were introduced to one another, and the 
atmosphere was friendly. The two-days of hearing were organised as sequences of a 
mixture of invited witness and expert statements. Testimonies were invited rather than 
summoned. The statements and the format in which the experts presented resembled the 
academic conference with powerpoint presentations than a legal proceeding. Shue's skype 
testimony was projected on a large screen. Presiding Commissioner Cadiz invited 
comments and questions from the audience after each testimony.  
The heterogeneous assembly in the moot court room - composed of people who lost 
their homes several times due to typhoons, human rights commissioners, their clerks and 
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lawyers, fresh-faced young lawyers from Baker MacKenzie and Linklaters in the 
audience probably taking notes on behalf of their Carbon Major corporate clients, 
Greenpeace lawyers and activists seated next to them, expert and witness testifying over 
two days, and observers like me - made me think of the heterogeneous elements which 
materialise ‘law’: the distributed location of the hearings; media technologies of bringing 
the matter together; issues of law’s mobility, mobilisation of networks; the discursive 
construction of legal matters, which have the ability to materialise something which is 
not visible, such as global warming; the difficulty of establishing a legal matter despite 
real, physical, material harm as told in the powerful testimonies of typhoon survivors. 
There were also simultaneous fluidity and yet hedging disclaimer brackets between 
disciplinary expertise. 
My initial interest in the hearings had focused on the ways in which the Inquiry 
would transform scientific attribution principles and risks into legal responsibility and 
liability by reference to the fast-developing area of so-called attribution science, which 
calculates and attributes a defined quantity of greenhouse emissions to individual 
companies or countries. Richard Heede's 2014 report on Carbon Majors formed the 
central scientific foundation for the legal inquiry. It broke down the emissions to the 
largest carbon producing companies and states. The Inquiry's remit of investigating 
human rights violations that were allegedly caused by Carbon Major companies required 
a reconstruction of the linkage between historic greenhouse emissions, their contribution 
to climate change, legal obligations and responsibility not to violate them. In other words, 
the strength of legal reasoning rested on scaling down climate change models, linking 
past emission data based on past company and meteorological data across different spaces 
and actors, breaking down global carbon production over time, to typhoons that 
devastated the Philippines and in turn establish relation between all of the foregoing to 
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human rights violations suffered by the petitioners.  
Law, particularly tort law, deals with issues of risks in which causality between the 
actions of the defendant and the effects on the plaintiff is difficult to prove so that a 
likelihood of harm, a legal determination, rests on probability calculations (Goldberg 
2011). I was expecting a detailed questioning into the assumptions of Heede's report and 
the attribution sciences, as the scale and complexity of proving the plausibility soundness 
of the petitioners' claims was extraordinary and would require linking the three scales of 
the individual, legal and scientific experiences and modes of reasoning. But climate 
sciences, including attribution sciences, were not opened up and left intact as truth 
statements. Myles Allen, one of the co-authors of the IPCC 1.5˚c report, had also testified 
in the City of Oakland vs Carbon Majors case (case 3:17 cv-06011-WHA-2019) earlier 
that year. He expressed his surprise about not having been queried about the soundness 
of the climate models in that case:  
Commissioner Cadiz "Are you aware if any of the fossil fuel 
companies use attribution science to look at their impact?" 
Prof Myles Allen: "I am not aware but one interesting case, 
all on public record, the companies did not dispute the 
large-scale warming and attributable harm. The focus on 
what was known when. There was no serious debate about 
the kind of work I do. I came away a little disappointed 
because I was expecting an argument, and there was none." 
(Transcript, London, 7 November 2018) 
Perhaps based on previous experiences of giving expert testimony, Allen's 
statement was the only one that attempted to draw a boundary between 'legal' knowledge 
and other kinds, although he seemed to have a distinct sense of what would make a good 
legal argument or judgment: "The plaintiffs lost in San Francisco. I commend the 
judgment to you, it's a very intelligent judgment ...as lawyers you should read the 
judgment, I am not a lawyer". Later he reverted to his scientific persona: "I am only saying 
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as a scientist what would have been technically possible." Despite an explicit positioning 
of his identity as a non-lawyer but as a climate modelling scientist ("the panel should hear 
on climate change experts on the Philippines. I am global climate modeller, it's not my 
brief"), Allen's statement was carefully crafted and delineated a historical relation 
between carbon emissions, scientific knowledge at a given point in time, and the carbon 
majors' moral responsibility. His testimony linked the question of available knowledge at 
a certain time to questions of responsibility and harm. Allen addressed the question 
whether the companies could have foreseen warming and avoided harm. Referring to the 
economist, William Nordhaus' 1977 'Strategies for control of carbon dioxide' paper 
(Cowles discussion paper 477, 6 January 1977), Allen contextualised the state of 
knowledge in 1977, which had - with hindsight - correctly estimated the change of global 
temperature with continued fossil use. He situated the "sciences" by explaining that 
Nordhaus' study was not a "niche science", but that Nordhaus was drawing data from 
mainstream climate science community at that time. These had not been based on 
modelled extrapolations, but on already available data about temperature and fossil 
expenditure: "This was not a niche research confined to a particular economist but this 
was reasonably established knowledge by the 1980s. The papers of fuel industry also 
show that they were well aware of the warming." The industry, equipped with the 
knowledge in the 1980s, could have prevented the exponential climate change that we are 
currently experiencing. Here Allen's rhetoric resembled legal advocacy than a 
disinterested Mertonian scientific expert statement: "The crucial point is - in my view - 
and I would like you to consider this - that there was an alternative course of action to the 
industry." 
Allen seemed fully prepared to provide justifications for the methodology of 
climate change models. He emphasised several times that the attribution science findings 
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had been based on historical data rather than modelled predictions. It seemed to me that 
he was acutely aware of the difficulty of establishing substantive legal connection 
between past moral responsibility to recent harm. Yet at the same time, when answering 
the question whether typhoons, such as the "super-typhoon" Yolanda, were caused by 
human factors or not in light of the findings by climate scientists (Takayabu et al. 2015), 
he worded his explanation with extreme care and differentiated between simple models 
of causality (Humean billiard game) and probable causality. It made clear that there was 
no linear or direct causality at play, but rather a higher probability of an event:  
... the answer is not certain. It's not a billiard game. It's a 
much more chaotic situation. You can't say precisely in an 
individual instance that an external driver such as large 
scale warming will influence a chaotic event such as 
typhoon... You can't say that there is higher wind due to 
human influence, but [we can say that there is] an average 
increase, higher probability of very high wind, with human 
influence.... it's not the warming or human influences have 
caused the storms but we can see from the study (it can be 
recommended as it is a carefully constructed study) it shows 
how human influences have increased wind level and 
therefore made storms more intense. (my transcript) 
I was sitting next to Veronica Cabe who survived a series of typhoons and also gave 
a testimony, as Myles Allen was explaining scientific graphs on the screen. I wondered 
what she thought of these visualisations when their experiences of the typhoon were 
literally so different from the "carefully constructed study" that was being explained. In 
London, two typhoon victims testified: Marielle Bacason who had survived Typhoon 
Haiyan and was now a research nurse based in London and Veronica Cabe who was a 
community organiser for the Nuclear Free Bataan Movement and had experienced several 
typhoons, the worst of which was typhoon Ketsana. All commissioners listened intently 
to their personal accounts of the typhoon, perhaps even more so than when they were 
listening to legal and scientific expert statements. Their faces were fully turned and 
attentive. Cabe's statement of what a typhoon feels like when it occurs rendered on 
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human-scale the reality of what climate scientists have called "the increase in intensity of 
human-influenced storms":  
the water level was rising up to roof level. I needed to 
reunite with my family. The priority was to bring cooked 
food (they had no food for 24 hours) and dry clothes 
because of exposure to cold rain. They were cleaning 
already stuck in knee-level mud. Everything was lost: 
personal belonging, underwear, toothbrush. I was worried 
about my father's already bad health.  
The floods have changed our lives. I felt that parts of our 
dignity was lost [voice breaking]. 
We had to rely on help and donations. I went to relief lines 
and wait for hours, half a day for a parcel of relief, not 
knowing if it would arrive, line again for another day. Relief 
goods were thrown at us, neighbours were fighting each 
other just to get their share because it was chaotic, and the 
government was not ready for the ongoing floods at the 
time. We had to borrow money from anyone. 
Monsoon rain caused flooding again. We lost everything 
again. 
I knew that typhoon would come again and wreck 
everything that we had put up. 
When would this situation stop?  
When will the process of recovering and rebuilding end? 
Until now we yet have to get back our own house.  
My mother has psychological issues. 
My father before he died asked again and again: [says 
something in Filipino] 
He was saying "when can we rebuild our house?" 
In reality it is not easy because we do not have the money 
[voice breaks].  
Are we going to move again? 
[empathetic faces in the commission] 
I think this is my reality. 
For many Filipinos this is their reality. 
There is no choice but to survive the typhoon. Having no 
water, no electricity, not knowing that the family is safe. 
I ask: do we really have a choice? 
I have been engaged in local community organisation 
against coal and nuclear facilities. 
I have seen that poor communities have become even more 
impoverished. 
I believe that our stories and voices can be heard through 
this petition 
I believe that the governments and corporations have the 
choice to act differently.  
They have the right to do their business but we also have 
the right to be. (my transcript) 
24 
Although the Inquiry had no binding force, it had a familiar legal format. The 
testimonies were ordered, presented and matched with their administrative filing 
numbers. Every testimony started after associating it with the filed documents for the 
'record':  
Comissioner Cadiz: "what are the titles of these documents 
please?"  
Clerk gives the file designation, titles and length of pages 
("consisting of 15 pages") and adds that these confirmations 
are "just for the record".  
The individual testimonies were left in their entirety and lightly questioned for 
comprehension. During the hearing, the Commission did not explicitly relate the state of 
scientific knowledge to a legal finding of a human rights violation. Myles Allen's 
statement attributed the intensity of storm levels to human influence, but in my 
understanding, it appeared just short of establishing an unequivocal causal link between 
the responsibility of carbon majors to the human rights violations suffered by Philippine 
citizens. The hearing did not attempt to construct a coherent causal or teleological 
narrative. Nor did it choreograph or perform a drama. Rather it resembled a formalised, 
legally formatted, dissonant, polyphonic sequence. The order of testimonies seemed 
disconnected. The first day proceeded in this order: a UNICEF official, a UCL 
environmental scientist, a Church of England ethical pension fund advisor, followed by 
the lawyer acting for Lliuya against RWE etc. It reflected the fragmented totality of 
climate justice as an idea that ought to encompass multi-scalar, transdisciplinary, multi-
species perspectives, but which remained bound by pragmatic constraints (who would be 
available when) and traditional legal formats and procedures. The picture of a 'whole' - 
climate justice - in relation to its situated parts (testimonies, graphs, powerpoint, skype 
call, lawyers, cameraman, academics, files, screens, furniture arrangement) was left to the 
observer to piece together. This seemed to me more truthful and reflective of the current 
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kaleidoscope of conflicting realities than an adversarial adjudicatory format could 
achieve. 
 
4 Concretising climate justice by affinitive juxtapositions 
I started writing this essay from a perspective of cruel pessimism, which expects the 
absence of legal 'force', rather than expecting climate justice designed around human 
rights to lead us into a cruel optimism of human rights. Yet these perspectives are perhaps 
not all that different from one another. Derrida conceived law, or the meaning of legal 
difference, as a permanent radical opening, as "a question of ... all the paradoxical 
situations in which the greatest force and greatest weakness strangely enough exchange 
places" (1990: 929). I do not expect the nomenclature and rhetoric of climate justice to 
reveal or deliver justice.  
However as an 'internal' point of view-agnostic-critical legal scholar, who diagnoses 
how law works with pessimistic hope, I can trace and try to explain how the components 
in the system work and how to think about and with legal materials when justice is 
uncertain and unknown: which jurisdictions were claimed or not, how the claim was 
framed, which principle was invoked or not - tort, property or human rights -, what kind 
of evidence was oral and/or in the form of a written submission, which testimonies were 
invited, whether to record and livestream the hearings, the depth of financial pocket to 
sustain the proceedings... These are the materials and ingredients for a practical strategy 
or diagnosis of the necessarily contingent practice and artifice that is law. It is the specific 
composition of these elements and their relations to one another within particular legal 
rhetorical and practical framings that I mean when I use the word "concrete". To make 
legality concrete is to identify and observe the different elements of the overall practice, 
how they relate, and what they do in such a process. I do not know for certain what justice 
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is, and it is nothing insightful or novel to say that law fails it, but I can try to analyse and 
explain the texture of legal composition as it is practiced and the dynamic of a 
problematisation. Understanding the "plumbing" inside-out by diagnosing the particular 
ways in which the constitutive materials are linked to form an emergent legal matter could 
yield a more specific understanding of the often seemingly inextricable legal apparatus, 
abbreviated monolithically as 'the law' and the mechanisms of its stabilisation. This in 
turn might yield different strategies towards different ideals of justice; or at least, it might 
help us to understand law's paradoxes and particular failures of justice's absence.  
A contextualised, historically and theoretically informed notion of legal materiality 
is well suited to dissect and perceive shifts in scales and frameworks of reference. In the 
Carbon Majors Inquiry, 'climate justice' was materialised as a legal matter through 
specific locations, media and formats. The practices, utterances, presences, gatherings in 
the hearing and their textual and visual recordings were the constitutive factors for 
enacting the "matters of concern" of 'climate' and 'justice' although the whole of 'climate 
justice' was yet undefined and may remain so. Nonetheless, the mediated aesthetics and 
spaces of the inquiry, climate models, speech acts shaped the emergent legal matter of 
climate justice despite a lack of jurisdiction.  
During the hearing, the Commission evaded the question of causality. This 
muteness reflects Lord Hoffmann's observation that "causal requirements [in law] are 
creatures of the law and nothing more" (2011: 5). Instead of causality, the primary mode 
of relationality of the hearing was a different one, something I would characterise as 
affinitive juxtaposition. The hearing engendered a spatial and linguistic association 
between climate science and human experience by bringing together abstract scientific 
and personal knowledges and their different ways of knowing (by mathematical models 
and by narratives) into a common space. The Commission withheld from explicitly 
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drawing relations between them. It also did not translate the concept of climate into a 
legal idea of justice, nor did it transpose it. Rather here 'law' seemed to act as a distinctive 
attribute ('legal' testimony, 'legal' file, 'legal' inquiry) that imbued a shared quality 
amongst elements that had otherwise not much in common. The legal inquiry conjoined 
words, people and things loosely despite compressing climatic space and historical times 
into two days in a medium-sized room. The mere juxtaposition of diverse knowledges of 
the same problem (climate change) with its different phenomena produced associations: 
greenhouse emissions became associated with legal responsibility. But beyond this, there 
was no co-functioning that is characteristic of an assemblage (Deleuze & Parnet 2002: 
52), no stickiness of knotty entanglements (Haraway 2007: 287) and no entangling 
patterns of diffraction (Barad 2014). These may emerge in the future. For now, the only 
relationality between the materials was the differentiating practice of the Inquiry itself: 
the attribution of certain materials (witnesses, testimonies, presentations, graphs, 
numbers, narratives, moot court room...) as 'legal'. The hearing invoked affinities between 
disparate parts through juxtaposition, that is to say, a literal putting-next-to-one-another. 
The hearing in London did not mention or consider earth, or non-human entities, as 
legal agents. This is not surprising considering that the figure of earth is not a central 
component in both concepts of climate and justice. Despite Lovelock's Gaia theory, 
Latour's invocation of 'earth' as a political actor (2018) and Povinelli's conception of 
"geontopower" (2018), earth is not (yet) a legal actor. Earth still needs to be 'incorporated' 
in law. Even if mountains are recognised as legal personae, they need friends to advocate 
on their behalf, to paraphrase Miguel Tamen's book title, Friends of Interpretable Objects. 
Earth also needs friends to speak on its behalf. Yet I wonder whether the resort to human 
rights in face of a planetary and multi-species existential obliteration seems akin to asking 
nuclear scientists to assert their rights of nuclear research in light of nuclear warfare. Is 
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the anthropocentric response to a problem caused by a peculiar kind of 
anthropocentricism - disembodied, rationalist and extractive-capitalist-imperialist - an 
inimical response to the effects of climate change? Is the human rights focus of the 
'climate justice' movement re-enforcing an understanding of global warming as a crisis 
for primarily humans? I remain conflicted between the conceptual contradiction of 
invoking the rights of the species that have caused the issue in the first place and 
recognising the need for an efficacious legal pragmatic strategy in order to reduce carbon 
emission down to zero. Malm (2018), for example, rejects the hybridisation of the 
human/non-human and the nature/culture binaries. He criticises the Latourian concept of 
actant and new materialist ideas of innate non-human agencies as diluting our 
responsibility to act. It is, however, not obvious, at all, that anthropocentric human rights 
law, or indeed legal avenues, are the right means to the end. Law has so far been a most 
impotent mode of human regulation in the face of the large-scale problem of climate 
change, which also affects other kinds of beings than humans. 
My discomfort with human rights law as a truthful strategy might perhaps be 
alleviated if we diluted the human/non-human dichotomy. For our human language and 
discourses are not only our exclusive, purified domains, even in the realm of legal 
language which attempts to distinguish between 'legal' codes and materials and non-legal 
others. Human language is based on and surrounded by noises, as Lingis writes:  
The noise is not analytically decomposable, as 
communication theory would have it, into a multiplicity of 
signals, information-bits, that are irrelevant or that 
conflict... The noise figures as resonance and vocalization 
that, like the scraping wings of crickets we hear, contains 
no message [although crickets communicate in the 
ultrasonic range, too high for human ears to hear.] ... For we 
too communicate what we communicate with the 
background noise, and we communicate the background 
noise. (1994: 47-8) 
The noise surrounding the Carbon Majors Inquiry is arguably even thicker, mixing 
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the natural with the artificial. Added to the forceful "vibrancy of the land, the oceans and 
the skies" which move, rain and rise up, we also have the effects of oceanic cables, 
youtube videos, internet pages, camera angles and skype connections that represent these 
natural phenomena in other ways than as "noise". We have multiple human actors: victims 
of typhoons, legal commissioners, migrants, activists, lawyers, scientists, academics and 
journalists who share physical and online spaces with varying intensities. They are the 
ones which introduce the "noise" of anomalous climate and unattainable justice into the 
purified legal music of 'human rights' and corporate personhood. Already the noise might 
overwhelm any attempts to distinguishing them from 'legal' communication. At the 
hearing, there was no communication, but a calm sequence of cacophonic noises.  
Kohn's How Forests Think (2013) employed Charles Peirce's understanding of icon 
and index to make sense of non-human/human semiotics. The challenge for legal 
reasoning and imagination consists in "attending to the ways in which our linguistic, 
cognitive and bodily habits exist in relation to the world and emerge as a higher level of 
patterning against constraints around us" (Anker 2017: 208). I would add that such an 
imagination ought not only entail thinking law metaphorically in the modes of as or as if 
(Roger and Maloney 2017). Analogies and mimesis connect different knowledges via 
similarity, but also tend to privilege patterns of what we already know. We ought to make 
analogical explorations more careful by paying attention to particularities, that is to say, 
incorporate "respect for contextual, academico-institutional, discursive specificities, 
mistrust for analogies and hasty transpositions, for confused homogenizations" (Derrida 
1990: 933). Jurisprudential analysis has much to learn from the detailed studies of non-
linguistic representation, visual or modal relationality and communication found in 
history of science (Hoffmann 2017), art theory (Stafford 2001; Weigel 2015) and 
musicology (Dahlhaus 1968/1990; Pesce 1987), as well as from other kinds of 
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semiologies and world views (Anker 2017) that can enrich and complicate law's dominant 
tradition of written texts and narratives (Constable 2014).  
In law, in light of the finite little living organisms that we humans are, the scale of 
our importance is in an inverted and also perverted relationship to the planet. Such is the 
construction and practice of legal materials based on human communication, language, 
and their media of representation. In an anti-Copernican mode, in law, the world is 
comprehensible only if it revolves around it, and us, humans. In the legal hearing, climate 
and justice are materialised and particularised into human narrative scale. This occurs by 
resorting to the universal principles of human rights. Climate justice advocates in the 
Philippine human rights inquiry entrench a clear distinction not only between human and 
non-human actions, but also between corporations and human. They enlist different 
materials - from climate data, research papers to eyewitness statements of typhoon Haiyan 
- to construct a legal matter from the standpoint of human. It may be a more efficacious 
as a strategy than representing or speaking on behalf of, for example, an ocean or giving 
legal standing to a river.  
Yet there is an undeniable gap between the ideals of universal human rights and of 
climate justice. Human rights claims cannot give justice to 'climate'. Also it is not clear if 
'justice' makes sense to earth, fauna, flora. They may not perceive 'justice' as such. Perhaps 
justice is sought for 'non-humans' in solidarity and with the help of some humans who are 
treated as 'non-humans' and who are already at the receiving end of global warming. The 
legal performance of 'justice' through and in its materials (human rights categories, legal 
spaces, media technologies, filings, testimony of claimants, scientists, lawyers, ethicist, 
video recordings) may be incomplete and insufficient to represent and address the totality 
of climate change. Nonetheless it helps to particularise and 'scale down' a scale that is 
vast, probabilistic, rhetorically and technoscientifically mediated. It is our prosthetic 
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'sensory apparatus' of making and knowing climate change on a more human scale. 
Although it describes past events and experiences, 'climate change' as a reality denotes a 
statistical anomaly based on scientific models. These scientific numbers cannot be 
experienced in totality. We cannot feel a calculated probability. Arthur Koestler wrote that 
"statistics don't bleed; it is the details that count. ... We can only focus on little lumps of 
reality" (1945: 97). Turning of 'climate justice' into a legal matter is then perhaps the 
difficult and fraught attempt to form "little lumps of legal reality" without a claim to 
representational veracity of the relationship between nature, earth, non-human and 
humans. It will result in representational violence to the majority of (non-human) lives 
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2018. 
3 "I have often called for vigilance, I have asked myself to keep in mind the risks spread by this word, 
whether it be the risk of an obscure, substantialist, occulto-mystic concept or the risk of giving 
authorization to violent, unjust, arbitrary force." (Derrida 1990: 929) 
4 The Bhopal industrial disaster on 3 December 1984, was caused by an intentional non-compliance with 
Indian chemical safety regulation by the US-owned Union Carbide. Mieville (2015) recalls: 
"Between 8,000 and 10,000 people died that night. 25,000 have died since. Half a million were 
injured, around 70,000 permanently and hideously. The rate of birth defects in the area is vastly high. 
The groundwater still shows toxins massively above safe levels." Union Carbide settled out of court; 
its CEO was never extradited to India despite an arrest warrant. Union Carbide and Dow Chemicals, 
which bought it in 2001, did not respond to Indian court summonses. In 1991, the Indian Supreme 
Court accepted a settlement which had the result of voiding all claims against Union Carbide and 
protecting the company from future claims. Would it have been better if there had been legal 
'violence' or force, particularly in light of the scale of the Bhopal catastrophe? 
5 The outcome of the appeal of the Urgenda case in the Netherlands which holds the government 
accountable for breach of its climate-related obligations is expected for 20 December 2019 (CLI-
number: ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:887). The case of the Swiss KlimaSeniorinnen (Senior Women for 
Climate Protection) which claimed intergenerational rights and their violation of the government's 





case is on appeal at the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne. For more details, see < 
https://klimaseniorinnen.ch/english/>. Both are litigations against states alleging a state's breach of 
its domestic and international legal obligations.  
6 Lliuya vs RWE. Case no. 2 O 285/15. Litigation against private entity. 
7 2005 petition number P-1413-05; response: 2006 11/16/2006-AA-3276727) 
8 The intriguing cases are the ones which attribute responsibility to illegal harm or violation, for they have 
to prove a causal and/or probabilistically plausible chain of reference from action (or inaction) to an 
illegal effect, such as violation of property right (Lliuya vs RWE, see endnote viii), of fundamental 
constitutional rights of "life, liberty, and property" and of "reasonable safety, and that of the 
Posterity"(Juliana, et al. vs USA, et al., case no. 18-36082, filed 2015, still ongoing at the US Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeal, for more information, see <https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-v-
us>) or the Philippine Carbon Major Inquiry that is discussed here. For an overview of national and 
international laws and cases, see the climate litigation databases maintained by Sabin Center for 
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